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Playing the "Gender" Card:
Affirmative Action and Working Women*
BY MARY K. O'MELVENY**
INTRODUCrION
O nly seventy-five years have passed since women were allowed
to vote, and there are still those who would question the need
for gender-conscious actions to ensure that women can play an equal role
in our nation's political, social, and economic affairs. A mere thirty years
after discrimination in employment was formally outlawed by federal
legislation, the key enforcement remedy of affirmative action has become
a political football. The public "debate" about affirmative action has
missed the mark in many respects, often premised on deliberately
inaccurate assumptions about the nature of the remedy as well as the need
to employ it.' The affirmative action debate has also focused largely on
race, intentionally playing to the country's unresolved race relations
issues. This focus not only ignores the true picture of discrimination
against women in our society, but it once again marginalizes the issue of
gender equality by sending the false message that this issue has already
been satisfactorily resolved. In addition, it potentially divides forces that
should be united in support of remedies that take race, national origin,
and gender into account in the quest for a nondiscriminatory workplace.
*© August, 1996. All rights reserved.
** General Counsel, Coalition of Labor Union Women; Headquarters
Counsel, Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C.
J.D. 1971, Rutgers University School of Law. Prepared for University of
Kentucky Law Journal Symposium commemorating the 150th anniversary of the
Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments.
'For an excellent critique of the "myths" which are currently circulating
about affirmative action, see Abolishing Government Race or GenderPreferenc-
es: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-16 (1995) (testimony of William T.
Coleman, Jr., Partner, O'Melveny and Meyers, Washington, D.C.). See generally
BARBARsA R. BERGMANN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996).
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This Article explores the issue of affimative action and gender in the
employment context.2 To do so, it is necessary to recall the pervasive
discrimination against women that was widely accepted in the United
States for more than 150 years.' It must also be noted that consciousness
of gender discrimination played only a limited role in the early develop-
ment of affirmative action relief, and gender-conscious remedies have
received only limited consideration by the courts. Another factor in the
equation is the Supreme Court's failure to rule that sex, like race, is a
suspect classification warranting strict scrutiny of governmental classifica-
tions based on gender.4 This failure has also allowed the affirmative
action debate to minimize gender as a key issue. Ironically, the unwilling-
2 By focusing on gender discrimination, this Article should in no way be
construed as suggesting that racial and ethnic origin discrimination are of any
less importance, or that there should be any retreat from remedies that take race
and ethnicity into account to increase workforce diversity. The continuation of
discrimination against Blacks, Hispanics, Asian-Americans and other minorities
is dramatically evidenced by statistical data as well as by the personal experienc-
es of applicants and employees within these groups. For some of the many
excellentdiscussions of these issues, see generallyABA INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILrrms SECTION REPORT IN SUPPORT OF RESOLUTION ON AFFiRmA-
TwE ACTION (1995); FAIR EMPLOYMENT COUNCIL, RESEARCH EVIDENCE ON
RACIAL/ETHNIC DISCRMINATION AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN EMPLOYMENT
(1995); MEXICAN AM. LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND, AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: A USEFUL REMEDY FOR EXISTING INEQUITY (1995); NAT'L ASIAN
PACIFIC AM. LEGAL CONSORTIUM, ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICANS AND AFFIRMA-
TIVE ACTION: MYTHS AND REALITIES (1995); NAT'L COUNCIL OF LARAzA,
FACT SHEET ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND LATINOS (1995); MARGERY A.
TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPORTUNITIES DIMINISHED:
DISCRIMNATION IN HIRING (1991); WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OPENS DOORS FOR WOMEN OF COLOR (1995); Marc
Bendick, Jr. et al., Measuring Employment Discrimination Through Controlled
Experiments, REv. BLACK POL. ECON., Summer 1994, at 25; Nicholas Lemann,
Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), June 11, 1995, at 36;
Roger Wilkins, The Case for Affirmative Action, NATION, Mar. 27, 1995, at 409.
3 See infra notes 17-31 and accompanying text.
4 United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2276 (1996) (Virginia's
exclusion of women from admission to Virginia Military Institute ("VMI")
violates Equal Protection Clause; parties defending gender-based governmental
action must offer "exceedingly persuasive justification"); Mississippi Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (applying intermediate scrutiny to
an equal protection challenge to a state university's policy discriminating on the
basis of gender).
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ness to employ strict scrutiny for gender-based classifications means that,
under the Court's most recent rulings on affirmative action issues,
affirmative action programs for women may survive challenge where
comparable race-based programs will not.' Or, to put the issue another
way, white men may look to greater constitutional protections from race-
based affirmative action plans (however well-intentioned) than exist for
women challenging programs that discriminate based upon sex.
This Article also discusses some of the evidence which shows that
serious discrimination in the workplace still occurs today.' This data
clearly discloses why gender-conscious affirmative action programs and
approaches must be continued. For those familiar with the report of the
Glass Ceiling Commission,7 it is hard to imagine any genuine dispute
over the fact that women today still face substantial barriers to equal
employment opportunities. Yet, the exclusion of gender from the debate
about affirmative action overlooks the reality that all is not well for
women in the workplace.8 It also ignores substantial evidence that
discrimination against women dramatically declines when effective
affirmative action remedies are employed to remedy current and past
discriminatory practices that exclude or impede the hiring, promotion, and
fair treatment of women workers.9
It is this author's contention that bringing gender issues fully into the
affirmative action dialogue will facilitate public understanding and
s See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2112-13 (1995)
(applying strict scrutiny to a race-based employment preference program); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny to a race-based affirmative action program).
6 See infra notes 158-214 and accompanying text.
7 GLASS CEILING COMM'N, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, GOOD FOR. BusINEss:
MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HuMAN CAPITAL (1995) [hereinafter
GLASS CEILING COMMIssION REPORT]. The Commission will be referred to as
the "Glass Ceiling Commission."
8 See id. at 26-36 (discussing the various barriers which still impede the
advancement of women and minorities in the workplace). The Glass Ceiling
Commission Report indicates that only three to five percent of senior positions
in Fortune 2000 corporations are held by women. Id. at 143.
" See Affirmative Action: Hearings on H.R. 2128 Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-7
(1995) (testimony of Marcia D. Greenberger, Co-President of the National
Women's Law Center) [hereinafterAffirmativeAction Hearings] (noting specific
examples of situations in which affirmative action has helped women in the
workplace).
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acceptance of the need for this crucial civil rights enforcement tool.' ° By
openly addressing discrimination against women in the employment
arena, including the public sharing of individual experiences, it will be
possible to dispel much of the damaging mythology that has developed
about this key civil rights remedy. This sharpened focus will also
encourage the courts, the Congress, and the public to acknowledge that
the nation's "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination" '"
continues to have an impact on women today. It is this fact which
mandates our continued commitment to affirmative action.
I. AFFIRMATIVE AcTIoN: WHAT IS IT?
Because the debate about affirmative action has become clouded with
rhetoric, an objective definition is needed. In 1977, the United States
Commission on Civil Rights defined affirmative action as "any measure,
beyond simple termination of a discriminatory practice, adopted to correct
or compensate for past or present discrimination or to prevent discrimina-
tion from recurring in the future.'
2
Affirmative action works to ban discrimination based on an individu-
al's membership in a specified protected group - race, color, national
origin, gender - through the use of rules, programs, or other actions
which provide benefits or opportunities to members of that group who
were previously denied such benefits or opportunities due to past or
current discriminatory practices. 3 The principal focus of affirmative
action has been in the areas of employment and education - the major
routes by which people contribute as productive citizens to the wealth and
breadth of our national dream if given a fair opportunity to do so.'4
Affirmative action is very different from anti-discrimination laws.
The former encourages employers to take "pro-active steps to recruit, hire
and retain qualified women and minorities in order to ensure the
possibility of pluralism in the work force for the present and for the
future.""5 Examples of affirmative action measures that encourage these
'0 See infra notes 215-22 and accompanying text.
" Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
12 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STATEMENT ON AFFIRMATIvE ACTION
2 (1977).
13 See, e.g., Affirmative Action Hearings, supra note 9, at 4-5 (discussing
what affirmative action is and how it works).
" Id. (specifically discussing the different types of affirmative action
programs in the education and employment arenas).
15 Affirmative Action: An Overview on Race-Based Preferences: Hearings
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objectives include aggressive recruitment efforts that attract women and
people of color into jobs from which they have traditionally been
excluded. Such efforts go outside traditional word-of-mouth and "old boy
network" recruitment practices to sources likely to present substantial
numbers of qualified candidates who are not white or male.16 Hiring
goals that encourage diversity by rewarding managers whose work forces
include employees from backgrounds that are roughly proportionate to
workers available in the relevant labor pool represent another example.
In-house training and performance evaluations that feature and encourage
the value of workforce diversity provide still another example. None of
these actions are required by anti-discrimination laws, yet without them,
the chance that those laws will be effective is greatly reduced. In each
instance, affirmative action provides a method of promoting diversity of
experience and ability in the workforce which has largely been ignored
by "traditional" recruiting, selection, and promotional practices which
exclude and/or limit opportunities for minorities and women.
Affirmative action does not mean quotas, reverse discrimination, or
the hiring of unqualified workers. The courts have repeatedly held that
affirmative action considerations do not even come into play unless the
individual is qualified for the job he or she seeks.17 An effective
affirmative action policy focuses on individual potential, using hiring and
selection measures that correspond to the actual skills required for the
jobs, rather than relying on non-job-related and often biased decision-
making methods. When such measures are in place, women and men of
all races and ethnic backgrounds are the ultimate beneficiaries.
II. THE HISTORICAL LANDSCAPE
OF DISCRIINATION AGAINST WOMEN
Although the discrimination facing women today is often more subtle
than that which epitomized the nation's "long and unfortunate history,"' 8
there can be little debate about the relevance of that history. In fact, it is
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism and Property Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1995) (prepared
statement of A. Leon I-igginbotham entitled Senators, Where Would You Be Now
if You Had Been Born as an African American and/or a Woman?).
16 Affirmative Action Hearings, supra note 9, at 5.
17 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 625 (1987).
'8 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
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the empirical record of longstanding sex, race, and ethnic origin
discrimination that requires a continued commitment to affirmative action.
The denial of the vote to women was only one of a substantial
framework of laws and policies that treated women as secondary citizens
at nearly every level, including employment, public service, property
ownership, and educational opportunities. 9 In a 1994 decision in which
the Supreme Court ruled that gender was not a constitutionally acceptable
basis for jury exclusion, the Court observed that women have historically
occupied a position that "was, in many respects, comparable to that of
blacks under the pre-Civil War slave codes." '2 The Court's recent ruling
in United States v. Virginia' pointedly referenced the exclusion of
women from the political process as well as from other economic and
educational opportunities dating from the Nation's founding.22 While the
histories of race and sex discrimination differ in many ways, there is
profound evidence that discrimination against women today, like that
against racial minorities, is inextricably linked to their historic second-
class citizenship status.23
Women were excluded from occupations as diverse as attorney 24
and bartender. It was not until the 1960s that federal legislation began
to address problems of gender-based salary disparities or to guarantee
equal employment opportunities for women.26 And, even then, we must
remember that "sex" was initially added as a prohibited category of
discrimination to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196427 not because
19 See generally BARBARA A. BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DIsCRIMINATIoN AND
THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975) (describing the dual system of laws
that governed the rights of men and women, and the intricate web of laws that
required employers to discriminate against working women).
20 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1425 (1994) (quoting Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1973)).
21 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
22 Id. at 2274-75, 2277-78, 2281.
23 For women of color, the impact of both histories is even more problematic.
See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991)
(considering the interrelationship between race and gender discrimination).
24 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1873) (ruling that an Illinois
statute which prohibited women from practicing law was constitutional).
25 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948) (upholding a Michigan
statute forbidding any female who was not the wife or daughter of a male owner
of a liquor establishment from being a bartender).
26 For current versions of such legislation, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994)
and 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
27 Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (current version at
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it was the will of Congress to end gender discrimination, but because
some members of Congress opposed to federal civil rights legislation
believed that doing so would kill the proposed law.28 Prior to the
passage of Title VII and legislation such as the Equal Pay Act,29 private
employers were free to discriminate in every aspect of the workplace. The
passage of these statutes provided women with legal remedies in their
quest to end employment discrimination, but they were only the first step
in the long struggle for gender equality. In 1972, Congress passed the
Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA"), which would have provided that
"equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex."'3 Sadly, however,
after a ten-year battle, the Amendment fell three states short of ratifica-
tion. 1
The failure of the ERA was dramatic evidence of the continuing
insecurity of women's status as equal citizens. Today, more than thirty
years after Title VII became the law of the land, women still face many
barriers to equality that demand the vigorous attention which is at the
heart of effective affirmative action remedies. Even more troubling,
affirmative action itself is at risk of being removed as a federally
permissible remedy for serious and pervasive discrimination.
3 2
42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994)).
28 See Michael E. Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress
Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth,
19 DUQ. L. REv. 453, 453-77 (1981) (discussing the various reasons behind the
addition of "sex" to Title VII, and citing numerous authorities supporting what
has become the "conventional" view that the addition was made in an effort to
sabotage the bill).
29 Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)
(1988)).
30 H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971). See generally Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights
Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J.
871 (1971) (providing a detailed discussion of the background elements and
potential impact of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment).
31 MALVINA HALBERSTAM & ELIZABETH F. DEFEIs, WOMEN'S LEGAL
RIGHTS 17 (1987).
32 "The Equal Opportunity Act," which is now pending in the Senate,
sponsored by former Senator Robert Dole, and in the House of Representatives,
sponsored by Representative Charles Canady, would eliminate all federal
programs that now provide for any form of affirmative action. S. 1085, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 2128, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The
legislation would overturn many key Supreme Court decisions supportive of race
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
I. THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTIoN
The concept of affirmative action has its roots in presidential
directives dating back to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.33
Executive orders calling for non-discrimination in federal employment
and government contracts were signed by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman,
and Eisenhower.3 4 President John F. Kennedy may have been the first
to use the term "affirmative action" in 1961 when he signed Executive
Order Number 10,925."5 That order required federal contractors to take
whatever action was necessary to ensure that "applicants are employed,
and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to
their race, creed, color or national origin."36 Gender was conspicuously
absent as a protected class.
President Kennedy's Executive Order followed on the heels of a 1960
report by the President's Committee on Government Contracts, chaired
by then Vice President Nixon, which concluded that there could be "no
justification for discrimination in employment because of race, color,
religion, or national origin in work performed by contractors paid by
federal funds .... " In addition, the Committee found that the problem
of employment discrimination resulted less from "overt discrimination"
where an individual's status is the sole basis for the refusal to hire, and
more from "the indifference of employers to establishing a positive policy
and gender-conscious remedies for discrimination in education, employment,
government contracting programs, and other areas, and severely limit judicial
enforcement of civil rights. Id.
" See James E. Jones, Jr., The Genesis and Present Status of Affirmative
Action in Employment: Economic, Legal and Political Realities, 70 IOWA L.
REv. 905-10 (1985). President Franklin Roosevelt signed Exec. Order No. 8,802
in 1941, and established the Fair Employment Practices Committee to investigate
charges of racial discrimination by federal contractors involved in the war effort.
Exec. Order No. 8,802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943). A. Phillip Randolph had
threatened to march on Washington to protest this discrimination if no action
were taken. Jones, supra, at 905-06.
14 Jones, supra note 33, at 905-10.
" Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963). See Jones, supra note
33, at 907.
36 Exec. Order No. 10,925, supra note 35, at 450. See also HERBERT
HAMMERMAN, A DECADE OF NEW OPPORTUNITY: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN THE
1970s 11 (1984).
37 PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON GOV'T CONTRACTS, PATTERN FOR PROGRESS 14
(1960).
870 [Vol. 84
1995-96] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WORKING WOMEN 871
of nondiscrimination.3 The report went on to attribute to employer
indifference the fact that
schools, training institutions, recruitment and referral sources follow the
pattern set by industry. Employment sources do not normally supply job
applicants regardless of race, color, religion or national origin unless
asked to do so by employers. Schools and other training sources
frequently cannot fill nondiscriminatory job orders from employers
because training may take from one to six years or more.39
Affirmative action was given more "teeth" in 1965 when President
Lyndon B. Johnson signed Executive Order Number 11,246, which for
the first time required federal contractors to take affirmative action to hire
minority group members or risk loss of their government contracts.40
The order specified various types of affirmative action which could be
taken: "employment, upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or
recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms
of compensation; and selection for training including apprenticeship.",
41
Noncompliance with the order meant that federal contracts could be
"cancelled, terminated, or suspended in whole or in part and the
contractor [could] be declared ineligible for further Government
contracts. 42 Federal contractors were also required to keep detailed
information and report regularly on their equal employment efforts.43 It
was not until 1967, however, that sex was added as a prohibited category
of discrimination." The Executive Order program was strengthened and
clarified in various Executive Orders issued throughout the late 1960s and
early 1970s.45
Thus, introduction of the specific term "affirmative action" in the
1961 and 1965 Executive Orders came at a time when broad public
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1989).
41 id.
4242 Id.43Id.
44 Affirmative Action Hearings, supra note 9, at 18.
45 See HAMIMERMAN, supra note 36, at 13-17 (discussing the various
executive orders issued during this period). By 1978, all federal contract
compliance efforts were consolidated at the Department of Labor in the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance, which enforces those programs today.
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acceptance of civil rights was only just taking hold. Brown v. Board of
Education46 was only seven years old when President Kennedy signed
Executive Order Number 10,925.4' According to individuals who were
involved in the early drafting of the regulations implementing the
affirmative action obligations imposed by these Executive Orders, there
was relatively little discussion of, much less adverse reaction to, the
concept at that time.48 One hopes that this was due to the fact that the
country was just coming to grips with the full picture of racial discrimi-
nation, with all of its shameful components. Certainly, this was due, at
least in part, to the fact that no specific enforcement efforts existed for
several years.49 When President Johnson signed Executive Order
Number 11,246, Title VII had not yet become effective. It was not
until 1972 that Congress amended Title VII to include Section 706(g),
giving the courts power to order employers to take broad affirmative
action measures once a judicial finding of job discrimination was
made. 0
When affirmative action first became part of the civil rights remedial
landscape it was unaccompanied by the type of intense rhetoric that
characterizes today's discussion of the topic.5" In fact, support for
affirmative action was bipartisan. During the debates on the 1972
amendments to Title VII, Congress specifically rejected proposals to limit
federal contractor compliance programs and eliminate goals and
timetables.52 In addition, Congress spumed efforts to eliminate statutory
language that allowed courts to "order such affirmative action as may be
46 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"' Exec. Order No. 10,925, supra note 35. Decided along with Brown was
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the first major case to impose on the
federal government an obligation not to discriminate.
" See, e.g., Jones, supra note 33, at 908-10.
49 See id. at 909 ("I suspect the great acceptance of the idea, or at least the
lack of a public flap over it at the time it was introduced, stemmed from a
failure to see its potential or, if recognized, a belief that the government would
be unable either to define the obligation or to enforce it.").
-0 Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (1994)).
51 See KATHANNE W. GREENE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND PRINCIPLES OF
JUSTICE 51-54 (1989) (discussing the legislative history of the 1972 amendments
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and recognizing that an amendment aimed at
dismantling affirmative action was defeated by a substantial margin).
52 Id.
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appropriate.' ' 3 The 1972 amendments also obligated federal agencies to
implement affirmative action programs to ensure equal employment
opportunities for minorities and women. 4
Congress passed other legislation that included specific "affirmative
action" obligations during the 1970s." In 1979, EEOC first issued
affirmative action guidelines, which also received broad support. 6 Even
after affirmative action had been the target of substantial legal assaults,
many led by the Reagan and Bush Justice Departments, it survived as an
acceptable remedy for employment discrimination when the 1991
amendments to the Civil Rights Act were enacted1 7 The 1991 Act
contains a clear directive that "nothing in the amendments... shall be
construed to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or
conciliation agreements that are in compliance with the law."58 Again,
bipartisan support was key to the defeat of anti-affirmative action
proposals, as was the effective advocacy of national women's rights
organizations such as the Women's Legal Defense Fund and the National
Women's Law Center.
5 See id.
See generally CrrIZENS' COMM'N REPORT ON CIvIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMA-
TIVE ACTION TO OPEN THE DooRs OF OPPORTUNrrY 51-54 (1984) [hereinafter
CmzENs' COMMIssIoN REPORT] (providing an extensive history of the early
support for affirmative action).
" The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 obligated federal contractors to undertake
affirmative action efforts for handicapped workers. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat.
355 (1973) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988)). The Vietnam Era
Veterans Readjustment Acts of 1972 and 1974 imposed the same obligations to
ensure the employment of veterans. Pub. L. No. 92-540, 86 Stat. 1074 (1972)
(codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-3107 (1994)); Pub. L. No. 93-508, 88 Stat. 1578
(1974) (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 219-2026 (1994)).
56 Guidelines on Affirmative Action Appropriate Under Title VII, 29
C.F.R. §§ 1608-1608.12 (1995). EEOC prefaced the Guidelines by noting that
the passage of Title VII had "established a national policy against discrimina-
tion in employment.... In addition, Congress strongly encouraged employers,
labor organizations and other persons subject to Title VII ... to act on a
voluntary basis to modify employment practices and systems which constituted
barriers to equal employment opportunity, without awaiting litigation or formal
government action." 29 C.F.R. 1608.1(b) (1995). These guidelines remain
operative today.
57 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1076, § 116 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000bb-4 (1994)).
58 Id.
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IV. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AFFIRMATIVE AcTON
While there have been many key Supreme Court rulings addressing
the proper boundaries of affirmative action in the past quarter-century,59
only two have specifically addressed gender-based preferences.60 At
present, the Court's treatment of gender discrimination is diminished by
its refusal to rule that governmental classifications based upon gender,
like those based on race, require analysis under the constitutional standard
of strict scrutiny."s Unfortunately, this disparity was not corrected in
United States v. Virginia,62 the case challenging the exclusion of women
from VMI, Virginia's all-male military academy. s3 Justice Ginsburg's
" See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995);
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S.
616 (1987); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Local Number 93,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Local 28, Sheet
Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561 (1983); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
60 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1986); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
61 See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 641-42 (upholding a gender-based employment
preference and not implementing strict scrutiny).
62 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
63 The United States sued the Commonwealth of Virginia and others
responsible for the operation of the VMI under 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6, on the
complaint of a female high school student who was denied admission under
VMI's male-only admissions policy. The United States argued that the policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause. The district court held that excluding
women was substantially related to important state interests of providing
opportunities for single-sex education through a distinctive program of military-
style education. United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1413-15 (W.D.
Va. 1991), vacated, 976 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. deniedsub nom. Virginia
Military Inst. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993). On appeal, a panel of the
Fourth Circuit held that VMI's admissions policy violated the Equal Protection
Clause, rejecting the claim that an important state policy justified segregated
educational opportunities, particularly in light of the state's general policy of
encouraging diversity in educational opportunities. The court concluded that
"neither the goal of producing citizen soldiers nor VMI's implementing
methodology is inherently unsuitable to women," and remanded the case for
determination of whether alternatives were available. United States v. Virginia,
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opinion for the majority reviewed the Court's precedent in cases raising
gender-based classifications but declined to make sex a "proscribed
classification" subject to strict scrutiny. Instead, the heightened review
given to such classifications required an "exceedingly persuasive
justification.""
Justice Ginsburg went on to note that "inherent differences" between
men and women should be appreciated, not used as a basis for placing
"artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity. ' 65 Thus, "sex
classifications" are appropriate to "compensate women 'for particular
economic disabilities [they have] suffered,' to 'promot[e] equal employ-
ment opportunity,' [or] to advance full development of the talent and
capacities of our Nation's people," but not "to create or perpetuate the
legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.,
66
In dissent, Justice Scalia was sharply critical of the Court's descrip-
tion of the intermediate scrutiny standard and the "exceedingly persuasive
976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2431 (1993).
On remand, creation of an all-female VMI at Mary Baldwin College, a
private liberal arts institution, was proposed by the respondents and acceptedby
the district court, even though the alternativeprogram differed substantially from
the program offered to males at VMI. The alternative program, Virginia
Women's Institute for Leadership ("VWIL") differed in many ways from the
VI program. Nonetheless, the court acceptedthe argument that "developmental
and emotional differencesbetweenthe sexes" provided a pedagogicaljustification
for the separate program and concluded that "a military model... would be
wholly inappropriate for educating and training most women for leadership
roles." United States v. Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 476 (W.D. Va. 1994), afTd,
44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), reversed and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). The
court of appeals affirmed that ruling, using a "special intermediate scrutiny test"
to justify Virginia's stated objective of "providing the option of a single-gender
college education" because a "substantively comparable" program was available.
United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229, 1236-37 (4th Cir. 1995), reversed and
remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that
VWIL was not equal in military training or in educational offerings, faculty
credentials, physical facilities, financial endowments, student body, alumni
support, or overall prestige. 116 S. Ct. at 2282-87. Since Virginia was unable to
meet its demanding burden of providing an "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" for the exclusion of women from VMI, the Equal Protection Clause was
violated. Id. at 2276.
64 116 S. Ct. at 2274-76.
65 Id. at 2276.
66 Id. (citations omitted).
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justification" requirement.67 Far from concluding that strict scrutiny
should even be an option for consideration in cases of gender-based
classifications, Justice Scalia believed the "stronger argument" would
warrant "reducing it to rational basis review."6 In his view, statutes
such as Title VII and the Equal Pay Act have done their job in placing
women outside the category of a minority group deserving of any special
judicial concern."
Unfortunately, the Court's inability to embrace strict scrutiny for
gender-based classifications allows some to conclude that discrimina-
tion against women is no longer a problem, thereby undermining the
argument for affirmative action remedies when it is proven to exist.
While the majority suggests that affirmative remedial programs based on
gender may well advance legitimate governmental objectives," such
programs - particularly affirmative action efforts - should survive strict
scrutiny as well if carefully structured to address existing problems
caused by sex discrimination." The Court's affirmative action rulings
underscore the need for a uniform standard of review for all remedial
programs required by discriminatory treatment of minorities and of
women.
72
To illustrate some of the general rules that have been applied in
evaluating race and gender-conscious remedies, several of the Court's
affirmative action rulings are discussed below. It is clear, however, that
as long as intermediate scrutiny remains the standard by which gender-
based governmental programs are judged, negative messages may still be
sent with every ruling that evaluates race and sex discrimination by
different standards.
67 Id. at 2293-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 2295-96.
69 Id. at 2296. In addition, Justice Scalia argued that the fact that women
make up "a majority of the" electorate" removes them from the "discrete and
insular minority" category entitled to heightened judicial review under United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
70 116 S. Ct. at 2276.
7" In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995),
Justice O'Connor noted that strict scrutiny of affirmative action programs based
on race or national origin was not necessarily going to be "fatal in fact."
72 Historically, and currently, women of color are frequently victims of
"multiple discrimination." Yet, very few cases have analyzed the effect of
discrimination based on combined characteristics. See, e.g., Lam v. University
of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994) (Asian women are protected subclass
under Title VII).
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The Supreme Court first validated affirmative action principles in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.73 Alan Bakke, a white
medical school applicant, challenged the school's policy of reserving a
specific number of places for minority group applicants after he was
denied admission. A majority of the Court concluded, using strict
scrutiny, that the educational set-aside program was unconstitutional
because there had been no findings that the school had previously
discriminated against minority applicants, and thus, no showing of a
compelling governmental interest to support a race-based admissions
standard.74 However, the Court also held that race could be used as a
factor in the admissions process, in addition to other criteria designed to
admit qualified applicants, to promote the goal of diversity and correct
past exclusionary practices.75 Justice Harry Blackmun, concurring in the
Bakke opinion, eloquently expressed the rationale behind race-conscious
remedies: "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally,
we must treat them differently."76
The first major affirmative action decision in the employment arena
was United Steelworkers of America v. Weber." There, the Court upheld
a joint agreement between Kaiser Steel Co. and the union to reserve fifty
percent of the slots in a craft apprenticeship program at a Louisiana steel
mill for Blacks. This joint union-employer program was intended to
rectify a previously all-White workforce. A white employee who was
turned down for the program sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, arguing that he had been excluded on the basis of race.7" The Court
3 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4 Id. at 291-320. As a result of the UCLA program, numerous Blacks and
other minorities became doctors who would not otherwise have had that
opportunity. After the decision, the program was discontinued and subsequent
classes contained only one or two Black members. See Nicholas Lemann, Taking
Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMEs (Magazine), June 11, 1995, at 36. The
article compares Dr. Bakke's career (he was ordered admitted to UCLA after the
Court's ruling) and that of Dr. Patrick Chavis, one of the candidates who
replaced Bakke in the class of 1973. Dr. Chavis went on to become an
obstetrician serving the needs of medicare patients in a Black and Hispanic
suburb of Los Angeles. Dr. Bakke is an anesthesiologist with no private practice
who works on an interim basis at a community hospital in Rochester, Minnesota.
71 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-20.
76 Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
77 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
78 Id. at 198-200.
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held that "race-conscious" affirmative action programs designed to
eliminate "old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy" could
be appropriate.79 To pass muster, such programs must aim to remedy a
' manifest racial imbalance" rather than "to maintain racial ba-
lance.
80
Since the challenged apprenticeship program did not require that
white employees be discharged and replaced by Blacks, and did not
create an "absolute bar" to the advancement of white employees, it did
not "unnecessarily trammel" the rights of white employees."1 According
to the Court, the private sector employer retained a certain area of
discretion to voluntarily adopt affirmative action plans "designed to
eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job
categories."82
Although affirmative action came under increasing attack during the
Reagan and Bush administrations, several significant Supreme Court cases
during the mid-1980s continued to uphold affirmative action as an
important tool in the fight against race and gender discrimination. One
of these cases, Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n v.
EEOC,3 directly raised the issue of whether an employer could be
ordered to engage in affirmative action on behalf of individuals who
had not personally been discriminated against in that workplace.
In Local 28, a labor union had denied union membership to
qualified Blacks and excluded them from apprentice programs.8 4 After
extensive litigation, a court-ordered affirmative action program estab-
lished a non-White membership "goal" of twenty-nine percent.8" The
Court rejected the argument that these court-ordered goals were prohibit-
ed by law, ruling that "egregious" discrimination could indeed be
remedied by such race-conscious programs.86 Justice Brennan's majority
opinion argued that race-conscious affirmative relief furthered the intent
of Title VII:
79 Id. at 208.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 209.
83 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
84 Id. at 427.
85 Id. at 432.
86 Id. at 444-79. Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides
that courts cannot "require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a
member of a union" or order other relief if the denial of membership was based
on "any reason other than discrimination." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).
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The purpose of affirmative action is not to make identified victims
whole, but rather to dismantle prior patterns of employment discrimina-
tion in the future. Such relief is provided to the class as a whole rather
than to individual members; no individual is entitled to relief, and
beneficiaries need not show that they were themselves victims of
discrimination. 7
Justice Brennan warned, however, that "preferences" must be viewed
with caution, and that court orders must be carefully tailored to correct
the past discrimination at which it is aimed. Thus, plans which establish
"race-conscious" remedies simply to create a "racially balanced work
force," without specific findings of discrimination, are suspect.88
In Local 93, International Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleve-
land,89 the Supreme Court considered a consent decree which gave
hiring preferences to Black firefighters who were not actual victims of the
city's discriminatory hiring practices, but who contended that the city's
hiring, promotion, and assignment practices were discriminatory."
Justice Brennan again wrote the narrow majority opinion which approved
of voluntary agreements to remedy admitted past discrimination through
"reasonable" race-conscious relief.91
In United States v. Paradise,92 the Court upheld two court-ordered
affirmative action plans that required the state of Alabama to hire one
Black state trooper for every white state trooper hired until Black troopers
made up twenty-five percent of the force, and to award fifty percent of
all promotions in rank to Blacks if they were otherwise qualified and the
rank was less than twenty-five percent Black.93 The plans were ordered
following lengthy litigation during which the court found that the state
had artificially held down the size of the force to prevent Blacks from
87 Local 28, 478 U.S. at 474. Justice Brennan's opinion reviewed the 1972
Congressional debates leading to passage of Section 706(g). Those debates
focused on the issue of "quotas" and "preferences," not on limiting the type
of relief that should be awarded when past discrimination can be shown. Id.
at 452-75.
8 Id. at 475. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor were among the dissenters.
They argued that the 29% goal was a strict racial quota. Id. at 497-99
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 501.
90 Id. at 510-12.
91 Id. at 528.
92 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
91 Id. at 177.
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being hired, and intentionally restricted promotional opportunities for
Black troopers.94 Twelve years after the court's initial findings of
discrimination, the court concluded that the state's discriminatory hiring
and promotion practices were still "pervasive" and "conspicuous," leading
to the race-conscious hiring plan.95
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Alabama
plan as justified by a compelling governmental interest in remedying
proven past discrimination in hiring and promotional practices.9" It
found the plan narrowly tailored to meet that lawful objective. Immediate
promotion of eight Blacks to the rank of corporal, along with eight
whites, was the most appropriate method of dealing with the past
discrimination, since it ensured that discrimination would end in a
"flexible" manner that was properly linked to the numbers of Blacks in
the relevant work force.97
Gender-based "affirmative action" preferences were considered for the
first time in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,9 a case
challenging a female-only admission policy at a nursing school under the
Equal Protection Clause. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
applied intermediate scrutiny to strike down the policy. The Court found
that Mississippi had failed to establish an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for admitting only women.99 Mississippi's argument that
it was engaging in educational affirmative action failed because it could
not demonstrate that women lacked opportunities for training or
employment in the nursing field. Instead, said the Court, its policy "tends
to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's
job. '" °° Thus, the state "failed to establish that the alleged objective
[was] the actual purpose underlying the discriminatory classification," and
failed to show that important state objectives were served by establishing
a female-only admissions policy.' Similarly, Mississippi failed to
demonstrate that women in nursing school were adversely affected by the
94 Id. at 170.
9 Id. at 163.
96 Id. at 167.
97 Id. at 177.
98 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
99 Id. at 724, 731.
10 Id. at 729 (footnote omitted). Justice O'Connor noted that the school's
policy "lends credibility to the old view that women, not men, should become
nurses, and makes the assumption that nursing is a field for women a self-
fulfilling prophecy." Id. at 730.
101 Id.
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presence of men in their classes since the school allowed men to audit
nursing courses."0
In the employment arena, Johnson v. Transportation Agency 0 3 was
the first case to address whether affirmative action benefitting women
violated Title VII. There, the county of Santa Clara, California used its
affirmative action plan to justify the promotion of a female employee to
a position as road dispatcher with a county transportation agency even
though a male employee had scored slightly better on the qualifying
examination. The county's plan provided that gender could be taken into
account, as one factor, in making promotions to specific job categories
from which women had traditionally been excluded. It was created to
satisfy a "long term" goal of a workforce of women, minority-group
members, and people with disabilities in all major job classifications in
a proportion roughly equivalent to their representation in the available
county labor market. The plan also contained short-term goals to help
meet that objective.104
The Santa Clara plan was not prompted by any litigation. No specific
past discriminatory practices against women were identified, although the
plan did state that women had been traditionally underrepresented in
technical and skilled-craft positions.' Relying upon affirmative action
considerations, the county gave the road dispatcher job to a woman who
ranked fourth out of seven candidates, based on her experience, test
scores, and other criteria. One of the men who was not selected sued,
arguing that he had been denied the promotion, even though more
qualified, because he was male."0 6
The Supreme Court upheld the county's affirmative action plan, by
a six to three vote, because it was "temporary" and was intended to
remedy the historical absence of women in certain positions. In addition,
the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel" the rights of male employees
because it did not establish "fixed" numbers." 7 The majority opinion
by Justice Brennan concluded that the plan satisfied the requirements
earlier established in Weber because it was voluntary and designed to
102 Id. at 731.
103 480 U.S. 616 (1986).
104 Id. at 621-22.
10' Women comprised only 22.4% of the county's workforce, most in jobs
traditionally held by women. At the time the plan was adopted, not one woman
was employed in any of the 238 skilled craft positions. By contrast, women made
up 36.4% of the relevant labor market. Id. at 621.
106 Id. at 623-25.
107 Id. at 626, 630.
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eliminate a work force imbalance, without creating an absolute bar to the
advancement of men.'
The Court did not "regard as identical the constraints of Title VII and
the Federal Constitution on voluntarily adopted affirmative action
plans."' 9 Thus, the county's plan was evaluated using the analytical
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.110 Once the
plaintiff establishes that the employer has taken sex into account, a
legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale must be articulated (i.e., an
affirmative action program). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to
prove that the proffered justification is pretextual (i.e., the affirmative
action program is invalid).'
This Title VII analysis means that employers may have greater
flexibility to devise gender- and race-conscious remedies where a
statistically significant workforce imbalance exists in relation to labor
market availability. Under Equal Protection analysis, however, public
employers may or may not be able to support such programs, particularly
if there is no evidence of discriminatory conduct. In City of Richmond v.
JA. Croson Co., 2 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,"3 the
Supreme Court applied the strict scrutiny standard to race-based
affirmative action in contractual set-aside programs at the state and
federal levels, respectively. However, these cases leave unresolved the
fate of comparable gender-based programs where intermediate scrutiny
continues to be the Court's preferred analysis."' The Court's failure to
accord strict scrutiny status to gender classifications certainly raises the
question whether gender-based public employer affirmative action
"' The program must be "justified by the existence of a 'manifest imbalance'
that reflected underrepresentation of women in 'traditionally segregated job
categories."' Id. at 631 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
197 (1979)).
109 Id. at 632 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299
(1977)).
10 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (setting a standard of proof for Title VII claims
of race-based hiring decisions).
" Johnson, 480 U.S. at 625.
112 488 U.S. 469 (1988) (invalidating city plan to set aside 30% of
construction contracts).
113 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (remanding for determination of whether federal
program satisfied strict scrutiny).
"4 Justice Marshall, dissenting in JA. Croson, had observed that the Court's
decisions denying suspect status to gender-based classification "stand on
extremely shaky ground." 488 U.S. at 554 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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programs can survive challenges where race-based programs established
on comparable assumptions could not."5 Justice Stevens, dissenting in
the Adarand case, noted the "anomalous result" created by the application
of strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs designed to remedy
invidious race discrimination but only intermediate scrutiny to programs
intended to remedy sex discrimination." 6
The lower courts have already reached conflicting results when
applying these two different standards to set-aside programs affecting
both minorities and women. Some courts have used a strict scrutiny
analysis to evaluate gender-based affirmative programs, while others have
not."' While most of these cases have involved contractual set-asides
11 This term the Supreme Court denied review in Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996), a constitutional
challengebrought by rejectedwhite applicants to the University of Texas School
of Law's "flexible" admissions afffimative action program which was subse-
quently modified by the University. The appellate panel held that "any
consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school for the purpose of achieving
a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment," rejecting Justice Powell's view in Bakke that race (or gender)
could be a factor in a remedial program designed to rectify past discrimination.
Id. at 944-48. The Circuit also ruled that the State had failed to show that the
racial classificationwas requiredbecause ofthe effects of past discrimination. Id.
at 952-55. Justices Ginsburg and Souter, commenting on the denial of certiorari,
observed that "[w]hether it is constitutional for a public college or graduate
school of use race or national origin as a factor in its admissions program is an
issue of greatnational importance." 116 S. Ct. 2581, 2581 (1996). However, they
did not believe that the Texas case afforded the court an opportunity to rule on
that issue because it did not present a "final judgment on a program genuinely
in controversy."Id. Since the University was not defending the original program,
they viewed the appeal as challenging only the "rationale" of the Court of
Appeals in overturning a program that would not be reinstated, and thus not an
appropriate vehicle for review.
116 115 S. Ct. at 2122 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1.7 Not all affirmative action must provide gender-conscious hiring goals. In
Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 879-80 (11th Cir. 1986), for
example, a district court's refusal to impose such goals was upheld. The case
involved a trucking company's requirement that drivers have at least one year of
over-the-road experience, a rule that eliminatedmost women. In the court's view,
the elimination of the discriminatory selection criteria coupled with an obligation
to recruit women was sufficient to remedy the discrimination. If later proven
wrong, the court noted that plaintiffs could petition for additional relief. Id. at
880 n.34. See also NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548 (1lth Cir. 1994) (applying
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rather than the employment.arena, the difficulties posed by the applica-
tion of intermediate scrutiny to gender-based affirmative action have been
the subject of comment in several of these rulings."'
The Sixth Circuit, for example, ruled in Brunet v. City of Colum-
bus".9 that a consent decree established to increase the number of
women in the Columbus Fire Department violated the Equal Protection
Clause because it was not narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimina-
tion against women. The court employed a strict scrutiny analysis. 0
The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in City oflRichmond v. JA.
Croson Co., 2 ruling that there was no basis, even under the rationale
of Hogan,' for treating gender-based classifications in affirmative
action programs differently than race-based classifications." 3
The Ninth Circuit applied the same level of scrutiny to gender- and
race-based affirmative action preferences in Davis v. San Francisco.24
There, a voluntary consent decree entered in a Title VII race and sex
discrimination class action suit against the San Francisco Fire Department
strict scrutiny to race component of plan and intermediate scrutiny to gender
component); Brunet v. Columbu§, 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1190 (1994) (applying strict scrutiny to gender plan); Contractors Ass'n,
Inc. v. Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny to race
component and intermediate scrutiny to gender component).
11 See, e.g., Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382, 398 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(applying intermediate scrutiny to gender-based preference for women in radio
licensing applications); Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 735 F. Supp.
1274, 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (applying intermediate scrutiny to female-owned
business preference but severely criticizing the standard as providing "relatively
little guidance" for judicial decisionmaking), vacated in part, 945 F.2d 1260 (3d
Cir. 1991); see also Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d 419,
422 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 954 (1991), where Judge Posner, in dicta,
opined that "it can be argued that if discrimination against women is not so
invidious as discrimination against blacks, the case for using discrimination to
remedy past wrongs is less urgent; the past wrongs were less severe, less
harmful."
"9 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1190 (1994). See also
Colin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that sex-based
remedial measures must be narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of correcting
proven discriminatory practices).
120 Brunet, 1 F.3d at 404.
121 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
112 Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
123 Brunet, 1 F.3d at 403.
124 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 897 (1990).
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provided for the hiring of women and minorities in percentages equal to
their representation in the relevant labor market over a seven-year
period.
1 25
The decree settled decade-old litigation contesting discriminatory
entry level examinations as well as promotional practices. The local
Firefighters union challenged the decree on constitutional grounds. The
appeals court approved the district court's use of strict scrutiny analy-
sis.'26 It held that
the statistical disparities between the numbers of minorities and women
hired in the fire department and the numbers of minorities and women
residing in the City constituted a "strong basis in evidence" sufficient
to establish a prima facie case of past discrimination and justify the
affirmative action provisions in the decree.
127
Likewise, the court found that the decree was "narrowly tailored" to meet
its objectives in all respects except its duration, and modified it to extend
for seven years "or sooner upon the accomplishment of the objectives or
the goals of the consent decree.
1 28
Two other N-Jinth Circuit rulings, however, Coral Construction Co. v.
King County129 and Associated General Contractors of California, Inc.
v. San Francisco,30 used the intermediate scrutiny standard to evaluate
contractual set-aside programs favoring female-owned businesses, and
strict scrutiny to evaluate preferences for minority-owned businesses. In
Associated General Contractors, this resulted in the invalidation of that
portion of a city ordinance giving preferences to minority-owned
businesses but the survival of a preference for women-owned business-
es.' The court observed that "[f]aws that afford special privileges to
women raise some of the most difficult and sensitive questions about the
permissible bounds of governmental action within the confines of the
"2 The terms of the consent decree appear as Appendix A to the district
court's decision approving its entry. United States v. City and County of San
Francisco, 696 F. Supp. 1287, 1311-21 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
126 Davis, 890 F.2d at 1445-46 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488
U.S. 469 (1989)).
127 Id. at 1447.
121 Id. at 1447-48.
129 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992).
130 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987).
13 Id. at 931-34, 941-42.
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equal protection clause.""' 2 The court expressed concern over the
"dangers" of reinforcing stereotypes:
A thin line divides governmental actions that help correct the
effects of invidious discrimination from those that reinforce the harmful
notion that women need help because they can't make it on their own.
It is in part for this reason that the Court has required an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for classifications based on gender. While
helping women overcome the adverse effects of discrimination is a
sufficiently important objective to justify the limited use of gender-
based classifications, "the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory
purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry
into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme." The city may
invoke a compensatory purpose to justify a discriminatory classification
"only if members of the gender benefited by the classification actually
suffer a disadvantage related to the classification."' 33
While finding the preference for female-owned businesses "trou-
bling," the court upheld it because it "hews closely enough to the city's
goal of compensating women for disadvantages they have suffered," and,
"[u]nlike racial classifications which must be 'narrowly' tailored to the
government's objective ... there is no requirement that gender-based
statutes be 'drawn as precisely as [they] might have been.' "1
34
In Coral Construction Co., a similar set-aside program adopted in
King County, Washington was challenged. Again, the Court applied strict
scrutiny to the minority set-aside branch of the program and intermediate
scrutiny to the women-owned business branch. 3 It found that the
county had a "legitimate and important interest in remedying the many
disadvantages that confront women business owners"136 and had
considered evidence of discrimination against women in the local
construction industry when fashioning this remedy.'37 Thus, the Court
concluded that the means selected were "substantially related" to the
county's objective of eliminating discrimination against women.'
132 Id. at 939. The San Francisco City Council found that "women have
suffered disparate treatment in the area of business and employment." Id.
13 Id. at 940 (citations omitted).
'31 Id. at 941-42 (citations omitted).
13 Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 928-33 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992).
136 Id. at 932
17 Id. at 933.
138 Id. at 932. The preference for minority-owned businesses was invalidated.
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To summarize, employers have generally not been required to justify
affirmative action solely by admitting that they had discriminated. While
the Supreme Court has failed to articulate firm guidelines for drafting an
affirmative action plan that would withstand Title VII challenge, it has
made clear that a plan would likely be upheld where the record disclosed
a significant statistical disparity between the available qualified work
force and those actually hired, or other prima facie evidence of past or
current discrimination, and where the plan was narrowly tailored to
remedy that discrimination through the use of flexible goals that did not
take away vested rights from innocent employees and which ended when
the disparities were corrected.139 However, in the Equal Protection
arena, the analytical conflict remains between programs addressing racial
discrimination and those addressing sex discrimination because of the
Court's refusal to require strict scrutiny for gender-based classifica-
tions.
140
V. THE POsrivE EFFEcrs
OF AFFIRMATVE ACTION FOR WOMEN
Although few cases have considered the use of affirmative action to
increase employment opportunities for women, the fact is that affirmative
action has provided significant advances for women in the workplace.
Some of the gains made by minorities and women during the 1970s and
1980s provide dramatic evidence that affirmative action has been a
powerful, positive force in our quest for equality of treatment for all.
Some of these gains resulted from voluntary employer efforts to increase
the diversity of their workforce. In many cases, however, these programs
were prompted by lawsuits, or threats of lawsuits, or as a result of the
federal contract compliance program covered by Executive Order Number
11,246.141
These programs were put into place because minorities and women
were significantly underrepresented in entry level jobs as well as
management level positions, despite their presence in the qualified labor
market. Many studies demonstrate the economic progress made by
minorities and women because of these early afffimative action ef-
Id. at 925.
139 See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
140 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
14, See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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forts.
142 Companies subject to government contract compliance pro-
grams during the 1970s had a much better record of minority employment
than those that were not. Private employers who agreed to implement
affirmative action plans in this period had a much more diverse work-
force by the 1980s than those that did not.'43 As noted in a 1984 report
by the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights,
[t]he evidence shows that two decades of affirmative action have helped
produce many gains for minorities and women in our nation's work-
force. While neither a panacea nor a substitute for economic growth,
education, job training and ambition, affimative action has made
significant contributions to improved occupational status for many
minorities and women, a closing of the gap attributable to discrimina-
tion.'"
Some of the most significant improvements occurred during this
period in public service occupations, such as fire and police departments.
In 1983, women made up only 9.4% of police officers and 1% of
firefighters. Nine years later, 15.8% of police officers were women, as
were 3.3% of firefighters.
145
Other important gains have been made by women because of
affirmative action programs. More women of color are now managers or
on the managerial track. In 1980, only 3.2% of all managers were women
of color; by 1990, that percentage had increased to 6.9%. 41 Some
142 Numerous studies conductedduring the 1970s andmid-1980s demonstrate
the success of affirmative action in ensuring access to and more equal treatment
in the workplace for minorities and women. See, e.g., Bureau of National Affairs,
Reports, Studies, and Surveys, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TODAY 95-100 (1986);
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT
PATTERNS OF MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN FEDERAL CONTRACTOR AND
NONCONTRACTOR ESTABLISHMENTS, 1974-1980: A REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF
FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (1984); Jones, supra note 33, at
932-39; HAMMERMAN, supra note 36; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF BLACK MEN IN AMERICA (1986).
143 See, e.g., CrrIZENS' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 54, at 122-26; see
also Jonathan S. Leonard, The Impact of Affirmative Action on Employment, 2
J. LAB. ECON. 439 (1984).
144 CITIZENS' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 54, at 122.
145 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ED. No. 113,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES Table 644, at 407 (1993)
[hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1993)].
146 WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OPENS DOORS
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concrete examples will suffice to make this point. The 1984 Report of the
Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights cites the six-year consent decree
entered into by AT&T, in 1973, that provided for vigorous affirmative
action in recruitment, hiring, and promotion. AT&T's action was taken
in response to a lawsuit challenging sex-segregated job classifications and
lack of promotional opportunities for women and minorities. The results
speak for themselves: in 1971, minorities held 4.6% of managerial jobs
at AT&T, while women held 33.27%. By 1982, minorities made up 10%
of the managerial work force and women made up 39.6%. In the crafts
area, women increased from 2.8% in 1971 to 12.3% by 1982, while
minorities increased from 8.4% to 14% during this period. 47
The United States Forest Service also implemented an affirmative
action program during this period. As a result, the total number of
women in its work force increased from 27.8% in 1981 to 43.5% in
1991. Women in professional job categories rose from 11.9% to 36.9%;
women in administrative positions increased from 31.8% to 68.4%;
women in technical jobs grew from 17.5% to 33.5%.148
Voluntary private employer affirmative action programs have also
improved the employment picture for women. At IBM, for example, the
number of female office managers and officials tripled in less than ten
years. 149 At DuPont, management set high affirmative action goals to
increase workforce diversity. These goals were exceeded and DuPont
argues that its development of new markets and innovative programs has
been the evident result.'
Affirmative action has also reduced salary disparities. For example,
in 1975, African-American women earned fifty-five cents, and Hispanic
women earned forty-nine cents, for every dollar earned by a white man.
FOR WOMEN OF COLOR 3 (1995) (a policy paper) [hereinafter WLDF policy
paper], citing Institute for Women's Policy Research Analysis, Bureau of the
Census 1980 and 1990 unpublished data.
141 Sex-stereotyping was also affected by affirmative action programs. For
example, clerical jobs at AT&T, long dominated by women, began to include
more males, rising from 4.1% in 1972 to 11.4% by 1982. CITIZENs' COMMIs-
SION REPORT, supra note 54, at 126.
14' EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES, AFFIRMATiVE ACTION POSITION PAPER 5
(Jan. 1995), [hereinafter EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES PAPER].
149 CITIZENS' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 54, at 126-27 (citing
Affirmative Action Coordinating Center, A Statement in Support of Affirmative
Action: The IBM Story (1981) (unpublished paper)).
150 Jonathan Glater & Martha Hamilton, Affirmative Action's Corporate
Converts, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1995, at Hi.
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By 1992, those numbers had risen to sixty-four and fifty-five cents,
respectively, for every dollar paid to a white man.' In 1980, 51.3%
of African-American women age twenty-five or older had earned a high
school diploma and 8.1% had earned a bachelor's degree. By 1994,
73.8% of African-American women had high school diplomas and 13%
had bachelor's degrees.'52
Under the command of Executive Order Number 11,246, which
covers at least one-quarter of the U.S. workforce, federal government
contractors also dramatically changed the composition of their work-
forces.'53 A 1983 review of hiring practices at more than 77,000
companies with over 20 million employees found that minority employ-
ment had increased 20.1% and female employment by 15.2% between
1974 and 1980. These increases came despite a general growth in
employment overall of only 3%. By contrast, companies that did not do
business with the federal government had increases in minority and
female employment of only 12.3% and 2.2%, respectively, during a
period where total employment growth was 8.2%.1 4 The statistics also
indicate that minorities and women hired into federal contractor compa-
nies had higher-paying jobs and more mobility than their counterparts
hired at non-contractor companies. Black and female managers, for
example, increased 95% and 93% respectively in the former, and only
36% and 50% in the latter. 5
' WLDF policy paper, supra note 146, at 3, citing National Committee on
Pay Equity, 1994.
152 Id. citing Bureau of the Census, January, 1995.
... Employers subjectto the Executive Order program are requiredto develop
and implement affirmative action plans. These plans analyze the workforce,
identify job groups that have excludedminorities and women, establish goals and
timetables to improve hiring and promotion for those underrepresented groups
and demonstrate good faith efforts to achieve those goals. Failure to develop and
follow these affirmative action programs can lead to contract debarment as well
as costly enforcement proceedings. 41 C.F.R. Part 60-2 (1995). See generally
OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
NOTICE OF TRANSMITTAL No. 206 (1995).
154 CITIZENS' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 54, at 123-24 (reporting on
a study conducted by the OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, A REvIEw OF THE EFFECT OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER 11,246 AND THE FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM ON
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES OF MINORITIES AND WOMEN (1983)).
... Id. at 124. Similar findings were also made by University of California
Professor JONATHAN S. LEONARD, THE IMPACT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1983).
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Corporate leaders have consistently recognized that effective
affirmative action programs are good for business. 56 In 1995, the Equal
Employment Advisory Council ("EEAC"), a lobbying group composed
of leading corporate policy makers, reaffirmed the value of federally
mandated affirmative action programs, noting that conscious attention to
affirmative action helps identify and eliminate discriminatory practices.
EEAC concluded that when an employer is not "attracting individuals
from all segments of the community," it cannot "develop fully the pool
of available workers" or "compete effectively in a global market-
place.'
157
VI. SEx DISCRIMINATION ON THE JOB: THE CURRENT REALITY
The workplace doors are only partially open for women, and even
less so for women of color. Barriers to advancement remain substantial
and pervasive. Many of today's critics of affirmative action agree that
affirmative action was a necessary remedy when first implemented in the
1960s, 1970s, or 1980s. They may cite the same workforce changes noted
above, but argue that these changes prove that discrimination is a thing
of the past and that this remedy is no longer necessary.'58 Such oppo-
nents of race- and gender-conscious remedies typically argue that current
laws prohibiting employment discrimination are sufficient to address any
lingering discrimination issues. 59 Nothing could be further from the
truth.
Notwithstanding the substantial gains achieved by women and people
of color in the labor market, discrimination remains a stark reality today.
Discrimination claims have continued to increase dramatically, with
thousands of cases filed each year in state and federal courts, and an even
greater volume of complaints filed with the EEOC and state and local fair
employment agencies. 6 The Commission receives nearly 100,000
156 See, e.g., CITZENs' COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 54, at 130-46.
... Special Memorandum, Critical Issues in the Affirmative Action Debate:
Exec. Order 11,246, EEAC, Mar. 17, 1995, at 4, 10.
... Rhonda McMillion, Affirmative Action Struggle, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1996, at
93, 93.
"" A statement made by Senator Robert Dole on Meet the Press in February
of 1995 typifies this view: "[T]he people in America now are paying a price for
things that were done before they were born. We did discriminate; we did
suppress people.... But should future generations have to pay for that?" Meet
the Press (NBC television broadcast, Feb. 5, 1995).
160 David C. Belt, Election ofRemedies in Employment Discrimination Law:
1995-96]
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charges of discrimination each year. The latest EEOC statistics, covering
fiscal year end 1995, indicate that more than one quarter of these charges
involve claims of sex discrimination, sexual harassment, or violations of
the Equal Pay Act. Sexual harassment charges have increased for the
sixth consecutive year.'
Most recently, the bipartisan Glass Ceiling Commission found an
"enduring aptness to the 'glass ceiling' metaphor." After extensive
hearings and research, the Commission concluded that women and people
of color rarely reach the highest levels of business and that even when
they do, they receive lower compensation than comparable whites. 62
At Fortune 1000 Industrial and Fortune 500 companies, ninety-seven
percent of senior managers are white. In Fortune 2000 industrial and
service companies, only five percent of senior managers are women,
virtually all of them white. Of equal concern, very few women or people
of color are even in the "pipeline" positions leading to top jobs.' 63
The Glass Ceiling Commission also concluded that women and
people of color face "three levels of artificial barriers to [their] advance-
ment": societal barriers, including both "conscious and unconscious
stereotyping, prejudice and bias;" governmental barriers, including "lack
of vigorous and consistent monitoring and law enforcement;" and internal
structural barriers, including "outreach and recruitment practices that do
not seek out or reach or recruit minorities and women, .... initial placement
and clustering" in positions that are not on the "career track to the top,"
lack of mentoring, training and opportunities for career development, and
use of different, often biased, performance standards."6
The Glass Ceiling Commission focused on the nation's largest
businesses. Other statistics demonstrate a similar pattern. For example,
although white men constitute a minority of the total work force (forty-
seven percent) 65 and of the college-educated work force (forty-eight
Doorway into the Legal Hall of Mirrors, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 145, 153
(1995).
161 Telephone Interview with Reginald Welch, Director, EEOC Office of
Communications (Dec. 13, 1995). EEOC's statistics are compiled annually for
its fiscal year ending September 31.
162 GLASS CEILING COMMIssION REPORT, Introductionby SecretaryofLabor,
supra note 7, at S2-3.
163 Id. In 1994, only two of the Fortune 1000 companies had female Chief
Executive Officers. Id. at 12.
'6' Id. Overview, at 5-6.
165 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1993), supra note 145, Table 622, at 343.
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percent), they dominate the top jobs in virtually every field.' 66 White
males comprise 91.7% of officers and 88.1 percent of directors.'6 7 Men
hold over ninety percent of the top news media jobs, 168 and almost
ninety percent of all reporters are white. 169 White men constitute over
eighty-six percent of partners in major law firms.' 1 ' White men make
up eighty-five percent of tenured college professors.'7 ' White men
occupy over eighty percent of the management jobs in advertising,
marketing and public relations.'72 The median weekly earnings of white
males in 1992 were thirty-three percent higher than those of any other
group in America."
While women are over half of the adult population'74 and nearly
half of the workforce,'75 most continue to work in traditionally "fe-
male" jobs such as teachers, nurses, clerical workers, and librarians.
17 6
Women remain severely underrepresented in most non-traditional
professional occupations as well as blue collar trades.177 Even though
women and people of color now hold jobs in many fields that were
closed to them before voluntary and court-ordered affirmative action
plans, traditional "old boy" networks still abound. For example, a 1994
study conducted by the New York Police Department found that new
166 Id. Table 234, at 154.
167 Mark Lowery, The War on Equal Opportunity, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Feb.
1, 1995, at 148.
16 A Long Way to Go, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 24, 1989, at 74.
169 Monte R Young, Striving for Color in the Newsroom, NEWSDAY, Aug.
1, 1994, at A13 (quoting the American Society of Newspaper Editors).
170 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ED. No. 114,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF TiE UNITED STATES Table 637, at 407 (1994)
[hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1994)]; BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA
N. CARSON, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT
10 (1994) [hereinafter LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT].
171 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1993), supra note 145, Table 637, at 407-10.
172 Id.
173 Id. Table 671, at 426.
174 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1994), supra note 170, Table 616, at 396.
175 9 TO 5, PROFILE OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1994-1995) (based on U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Census data) (on file with author).
176 Id. at 2; see also STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1994), supra note 170, Table
637, at 407-09; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ("EEOC"),
JOB PATTERNS FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY Table 1, at
1036 (1993) [hereinafter EEOC JOB PATTERNS]; Sam Roberts, Women's Work:
What's New, What Isn't, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1995.
177 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1994), supra note 170, Table 637, at 407-09.
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officers followed friends or relatives onto the police force. As a result,
most new recruits resemble the rest of the force: white, male, overwhelm-
ingly Catholic (seventy-three percent), resident of the suburbs or lower
crime areas; fully fifty percent of new recruits have a relative who is or
was a New York City police officer. Thus, a resilient network of white
men continue to have a "pipeline" into these jobs despite repeated efforts
to diversify the police force, and the 1994 class remained predominantly
white (sixty-three percent) and male (eighty-four percent).'
78
Women continue to be dramatically underrepresented in non-
traditional professions and blue collar trades. Women make up 8.6% of
all engineers; .3.9% of airline pilots and navigators; less than 1% of
carpenters; 18.6% of architects; and slightly more than one-fifth of all
doctors and lawyers.
179
This disproportionate clustering also means that women workers
receive lower pay and fewer benefits than men. For example, eighty-two
percent of administrative workers in all industries are women. 8 °
Women make up 99.3% of dental hygienists,' 8 ' but only 10.5% of
dentists.'82 Even where women enter professions that had been tradi-
tionally male, they do not advance proportionately to their male
colleagues. Women hold only eleven percent of law firm partnerships,
even though they make up twenty-three percent of all lawyers. '83
Women make up forty-eight percent of all editors and reporters,'84 but
hold only six percent of journalism's top jobs.'85 Women hold seventy-
two percent of elementary school teaching positions, but make up only
twenty-nine percent of school principals.'86 A study cited by the Glass
Ceiling Commission concluded that after eleven years on medical school
faculties, five percent of women had achieved full professor rank as
compared to twenty-three percent of men.'87
178 EQUAL RIGHTs ADvocATEs PAPER, supra note 148, at 3.
179 Id.
180 EEOC JOB PATTERNS, supra note 176, Table 1, at 1036.
18, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT (1994), supra note 170, Table 637, at 408.
182 Id. at 407.
183 LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 170, at 10.
184 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1994), supra note 170, Table 637, at 407.
185 A Long Way to Go, supra note 168, at 74.
186 COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, PROFESSION-
AL WOMEN AND MINORiTIES: A TOTAL HuMAN RESOURCE DATA COMPENDIUM
Table 5-11, at 142 (1994).
187 Bonnie J. Tesch et al., Promotion of Women Physicians in Academic
Medicine, 273 JAMA 1022, 1023 (1995).
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A dramatic earnings gap exists between men and women across a
diverse range of occupations. In 1993, women still earned an average of
71.5 cents for every dollar earned by men. 18 In 1991, women physi-
cians earned 53.9% of the wages of male physicians, and women in sales
occupations earned 59.5% of the wages earned by men holding compara-
ble sales positions.'89 Of the sixty-two million women working in the
United States in 1992, sixty-five percent earned less than $20,000 each
year, and thirty-eight percent earned less than $10,000.290 And the
median weekly earnings of white men in 1993 were thirty-three percent
higher than any other group.'91 From 1970 to 1993, 15.0% of white
males earned $50,000 or more annually. 92 Women fall well below that
percentage; during the same period, only 2.0% of Black women, 1.4% of
Hispanic women, and 3.7% of white women earned $50,000 or more
annually.'
93
Discrimination keeps women of color at the bottom of the economic
ladder, both in terms of salary and promotional opportunities. In 1993,
for example, Hispanic and African-American female workers averaged
substantially lower wages and salaries than men and white women.
Hispanic women earned $313.60 per week; African-American women
earned $348.54 per week; white women earned $391.52 per week; white
men earned $404.60 weekly.'94 Even when women of color hold
college degrees, they fall well below white men in their earnings. For
example, college-educated Hispanic women earn almost $1000 less each
year than white male high school graduates.'95 This earnings gap jumps
dramatically to $13,000 when compared to college-educated white
188 NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON PAY EQUITY, THE WAGE GAP: 1993 (citing
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
SERIES P-60).
189 WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK ON WOMEN
WORKERS: TRENDS AND IssuEs 35 (1993).
190 BUREAu OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-60-184,
MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED
STATES Table 31, at 150 (1992).
'9' STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1994), supra note 170, Table 665, at 429.
192 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ED. No. 115,
STATISnCAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES Table 748, at 478 (1995).
193 Id.
94 Bureau of Labor Statistics (unpublished data), Aug., 1994, reprinted in
WLDF policy paper, supra note 146, at 2.
'95 WLDF policy paper, supra note 146, at 2 (citing National Committee on
Pay Equity analysis of 1992 Bureau of the Census data).
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males.196 These numbers are almost identical for Black college-educated
women, except that they do earn slightly more than the average earned
by white male high school graduates.197
And, in those areas where women have made some inroads into
managerial positions, women of color remain severely underrepresented.
In the banking industry, for example, where white women make up
37.5% of executive, administrative and managerial jobs, Black and
Hispanic women hold only 2.6% and 5% of such jobs.198 In the hospital
industry, Black and Hispanic women each hold 4.6% of these jobs, while
white women hold 50.2%.199
Minority women occupy a disproportionately high percentage of the
lowest paid jobs - typists, clerks, nurse's aides, factory workers - and
are often concentrated in the contingent workforce. 200 In 1993, for
example, Black women earned a median income of $19,816, compared
to $22,023 for white women and $31,089 for white men. Hispanic
women earned a median income of $16,758.201 Even in sectors where
women have made inroads into management, women of color continue
to be underrepresented, underpaid "nd undervalued.
These statistics are a sobering reminder to all of us that we still need
affirmative action to force the doors of economic opportunity to open
wider for women and people of color. A recent poll indicated that eighty-
seven percent of men, compared to sixty-five percent of women, are
satisfied with their pay.2°z geventy-eight percent feel satisfied with their
promotional opportunities, in contrast with only fifty-seven percent of
women who share this view.20 3 Without the use of race- and gender-
conscious programs, it is evident that we will quickly return to the
indifference, if not the intentional discrimination, of the pre-affirmative
action era.
It is not surprising, in light of these continuing disparities, that the
Glass Ceiling Commission identified stereotyping as one of the major
196 Id.
97 Id. Black college-educated women earned approximately $1000 more
than white male high school graduates.
... GLASS CEILING COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 79.
199 Id. at iii-iv.
200 See 9 TO 5, PROFILE OF WORKING WOMEN, supra note 175, at 1.
201 INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, THE WAGE GAP: WOMEN'S
AND MEN'S EARNINGS (1995).
20 Remarksby Louis Harris, Feminist Majority Foundation Press Conference,
Apr. 25, 1995, at 5, and survey question tabulations.
203 Id.
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barriers to advancement for women and minorities in the workplace.2"4
For women, these stereotypes range from thinking that women do not
want to work, or work too hard, have difficulty making decisions, are too
"emotional" and are either too aggressive or not aggressive enough to
succeed. °5 Dramatic evidence of such stereotyping can be found in
complaints filed with EEOC where crude sexist and racist remarks are
cited in sworn employee statements.20 6 One recent complaint, for
example, recounted the recruitment policies announced by the CEO of
one of the nation's largest discount brokerage firms, asking that "young,
good-looking, studly males" be preferred rather than "broads."2 7 One
female manager at the company was stripped of accounts she had
successfully handled because her boss decided she was not spending
enough time with her daughter.2" 8 Professor Mari Matsuda recently
testified before Congress on the value of continuing and strengthening
effective affirmative action efforts. She recounted that a colleague had
told her that he had voted against her application to teach because he did
not think she could "maintain control in the classroom.
20 9
Closely related is the problem of sexual harassment which continues
to create serious obstacles for women in the workforce. The Glass Ceiling
Commission cited a survey concluding that fifty-nine percent of women
had personally experienced sexual harassment on the job.210 Similar
results were reported in a recent Merit Systems Protection Board survey
of 8000 women working in the federal sector. Nearly half of that group
had received uninvited, unwanted sexual attention at work during the
previous two years."
Recently, substantial jury verdicts and settlements in sexual harass-
ment cases have provided dramatic evidence that women continue to be
subjected to astonishing acts of abusive sexual misconduct at work. For
204 GLASS CEILING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 28.
205 Id. at 148.
206 B. Susan Antilla, Three Women vs. a Broker- Olde is Accused ofBlatant
Job Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1989, at D1, D7.
207 Id.
208 fd.
209 Affirmative Action: An Overview on Race-Based Preferences: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the
Senate Comm. of the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (Oct. 23, 1995)
(testimony of Man J. Matsuda, Professor of Law, Georgetown University).
210 GLASS CEILING COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 7, at 148.
211 U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL WORKPLACE viii (1995).
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example, a recent class action suit against the District of Columbia's
Department of Corrections revealed that promotions for women correc-
tions officers were more likely to be based upon the senior officer's view
of the women as candidates for sexual activity than on any other
criteria." ' When the supervisor's "judgment" proved to be incorrect,
the women were then transferred to undesirable positions.2 3 Del
Laboratories, a manufacturer of pharmaceutical products and cosmetics,
recently paid more than $1 million to settle an EEOC complaint brought
by fifteen female employees who described a pattern of lewd and abusive
behavior by the company's chief executive officer. '14 And, for every
case that results in a jury verdict there are countless numbers of women
who have not even reported their experiences, much less filed discrimina-
tion charges or commenced litigation.
The current picture for working women cannot be examined without
factoring in sexual harassment, gender stereotyping, and blatant prejudice.
There is simply no other explanation for the fact that women are largely
found in the lowest paid jobs, at the lowest rung of the career ladder,
marginalized in their efforts to advance, and treated less favorably than
their comparably situated male colleagues in every respect. Only by the
continued use of gender-conscious remedies can we change this depress-
ing picture.
VII. THE IMPACT OF THE GENDER EQUALrIY MESSAGE
Assuming that gender issues can be raised to a comparable level with
race in the public dialogue about affirmative action, it is to be hoped that
fuller discussion of the breadth of societal discrimination will yield
greater support for race- and gender-conscious enforcement measures.
212 Neal v. Moore, No. 93-2420, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11461, at *4
(D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1995).
' A jury awarded $1.4 million to six of the eight plaintiffs in the suit. The
Department of Corrections may ultimately face more damages. Toni Locy, 1.4
Million Awarded in Harassment Suit, WASH. PosT, Apr. 22, 1995, at B1.
214 Carey Goldberg, Company to Pay Record Amount in L.I. Sexual
Harassment Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1995, at Al. See also Benjamin A.
Holden, IBM Set Back in Sexual Harassment Case, WALL ST. J., July 18, 1995,
at B7 (discussing a sexual harassment suit in which a former marketing
representative of IBM was awarded $65,000 after her IBM supervisors pressured
her to have sex with a Pentagon director in order to secure federal funding for
the company).
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One commentator has described the positive role affirmative action can
play in increasing opportunities for women:
Voluntary affirmative action, in many instances, "arguablyprovides
the best means toward a speedy and effective breakdown of stereotypi-
cal sexist social attitudes." Whereas first-order discrimination is
generally evident, societal discrimination and sexist social attitudes go
largely unnoticed even by their own victims. A device to promote equal
treatment and to provide compensation to identifiable victims is useless
to combat this type of widespread discrimination. On the other hand, a
voluntary program of preferential treatment is more desirable because
it grants opportunities to individual women while conveying an
important message about women and equality in the workplace." 5
By ignoring the benefits of and continuing need for affirmative action
in promoting equal employment opportunities for women, there is a
danger that the public will continue to misunderstand this key civil rights
enforcement tool. This misunderstanding is exploited by conservative
legislators and commentators who want to divide working people on this
issue. Ultimately, this will lead to the erosion of gains women have made
in the quest for equal treatment and the reduction of opportunities and
choices
16
It has already been demonstrated that public support for affirmative
action can be strong, depending upon how the questions are framed. A
good lesson is provided by a recent Louis Harris poll conducted in the
Spring of 1995 for the Feminist Majority Foundation on the California
ballot initiative that would end state-supported affirmative action.217 The
215 Deidre A. Grossman, Comment, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans in
Italy and the United States: Differing Notions of Gender Equality, 14 CoMP.
LAB. L.J. 185, 217 (1993) (citations omitted).
216 For an excellent analysis of the key relationship between affirmative
action and gains made by women in the workplace, see JOCELYN C. FRYE,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: UNDERSTANDING THE PAST AND PRESENT, THE
AMERICAN WOMAN 1996-1997, 33 (Women's Research and Education Institute
1996).
217 Focus on Impact of California Initiative Brings Drastic Drop in Support,
Poll Finds, 1995 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 194 (Apr. 26, 1995). The
California measure, euphemistically known as the "Civil Rights Initiative,"
provides: "The state will not use race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin as
a criterion for either discriminating against or granting preferential treatment to,
any individual or group in the operation of the state's system of public
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survey revealed that there was strong support for the initiative until
people understood that its passage would actually limit equal employment
opportunities for women and minorities.218 When asked whether they
supported "preferential treatment" for a particular group, most said
no.219 But, when asked if they would support a proposal that would
"discourage and even end programs to help women and minorities
achieve equal opportunities in education and employment," a majority
said they would not.22 When Whites were asked if they favored
"preferential treatment," clear majorities said no, defining the term as
giving jobs to qualified women and minorities to the disadvantage of
white men. However, when asked if affirmative action meant "making
opportunities for everyone including women and minorities," a majority
agreed with that definition.22'
Another poll found that overall support for affirmative action had
decreased from fifty-seven percent in 1991 to only forty-six percent,
although fifty-six percent of those queried continued to favor affirmative
action for women.222 This suggests that bringing gender into the
forefront of the discussion about affirmative action may influence those
who do not understand what this remedy is or why it is necessary.
Working women play key roles in the lives of the supposedly "angry
white men" who are repeatedly cited as the "victims" of affirmative
action, and others who argue against race- and gender-conscious remedies
- they are mothers, sisters, daughters, lovers, wives, friends, and
colleagues at work. Thus, working women are uniquely situated to dispel*
the myths about affirmative action not only by talking about their own
experiences with discrimination, but also by talking about the opportuni-
ties they have been afforded because ofaffirmative action. Adding gender
issues to the discussion ensures greater public recognition that all who
have experienced discrimination should be afforded these opportunities.
It can help unify demands for fairness in the workplace for women and
men of all races and ethnic backgrounds, rather than permitting opponents
employment, public education or public contracting." Id.
218 id.
219 See Remarks of Louis Harris, supra note 202, at 2.
220 Focus on Impact of California Initiative, supra note 217. The Harris poll
queried 1400 adults nationwide. Harris described the results as "one of the most
clear-cut, incisive and significant surveys" of his career. Id.
221 Remarks of Louis Harris, supra note 202, at 3-4.
222 Discontent Grows Against Affirmative Action-Programs, but Not for
Women, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1995, at Al.
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of affirmative action to play off one group of disadvantaged workers
against another.
CONCLUSION
Enforcement of the nation's civil rights laws has not yet levelled the
playing field for women or minorities in employment or other arenas. We
are neither color-blind nor gender-neutral in hiring, training, promotion,
salary, or other benefits. And, we will never achieve that goal unless we
recognize that the vestiges of discrimination cannot be corrected by the
passage of laws alone. Recognition of past inequities must become part
and parcel of every employment decision until we have substantive
equality of opportunity. Assistant Attorney General Deval L. Patrick
recently referred to a broad range of activities designed to achieve this
end as "affirmative consideration" - actions that emphasize an individu-
al's full range of qualifications when decisions are made.223 We must
consider what our workplaces would look like if we abandoned affirma-
tive action today. We must consider what they could look like when it
can truly be said that every applicant and employee was selected, trained,
compensated and promoted using objective, non-discriminatory criteria,
and allowed to contribute to their maximum potential.
Women talking about their experiences in the workplace will give life
to the discussion of affirmative action. Gender-conscious programs and
selection procedures have opened doors to women of all races and
backgrounds. Yet most working women can tell a story that proves those
doors are only slightly ajar. Whether that story reflects their own personal
experience or that of a friend or co-worker, there is no doubt that it will
demonstrate that discrimination is still very much a reality in our nation's
workplaces. Those collected stories can soundly defeat current efforts to
roll back a proven remedy for job discrimination. We will know that
affirmative action is no longer necessary when we can stop talking about
it. Regrettably, there is still much to be said.
Hearings on H.R. 2128 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1995) (testimony of
Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S.
Department of Justice).

